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Abstract
We consider a stochastic control problem for a trader who wishes to maximize the
expected local time through generating price impact. The local time can be regarded as
a proxy for the inventory of a central bank whose aim is to maintain a target zone.
1 Model setup and main results
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P ) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions and sup-
porting a standard Brownian motion W . We suppose that in the absence of a large-investor
intervention the exchange rate S˜ between two currencies is given by a Bachelier model,
S˜t = S0 + σWt, t ≥ 0,
where S0 and σ are two positive constants. This unaffected exchange rate process will be
impacted by the price impact components of two types of “big players”. One of these “big
players” models the central bank of one of the two currencies, whereas the second one stands for
a strategic speculative investor or for the accumulated price impact of a group of such investors.
It is the goal of the central bank to maintain a (one-sided) target zone in which the actual
exchange rate must stay above a specified level c. Such target zones are frequently observed
on financial markets. The central bank keeps up the target zone through the permanent price
impact of trades that are executed as soon as the exchange rate threatens to fall below the
level c, thereby creating an ever increasing inventory. This accumulation of inventory is often
problematic for the central bank and frequently leads to the abandonment of the target zone
regime. A notorious example is the “breaking of the Bank of England” by the investor George
Soros on September 16, 1992.
The strategy of the strategic investor over the time horizon [0, T ] is described through
the trading speed (ξt)t≥0 in a linear Almgren–Chriss-type model, so that Xt =
∫ t
0
ξs ds is
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Figure 1: Plot of the GBP/DEM exchange rate from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992. On
September 16, 1992, the British government announced on exit from the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM), which was followed by a rapid drop of the exchange rate.
Figure 2: Plot of the EUR/CZK exchange rate from August 1, 2016 to August 1, 2017. On
April 6, 2017, the Czech National Bank removed the EUR/CZK floor, this was followed by a
rapid drop of the exchange rate.
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the accumulated inventory after trading over the time interval [0, t]. Here, we use a Markovian
control that may depend on the current time t and the current exchange rate St. It is important
to note here that S denotes the actual exchange rate after the central bank intervention and not
the unaffected exchange rate process S˜, which will typically not be observable to any market
participant. Thus, we assume that ξt is of the form
ξt = v(t, St), t ∈ [0, T ], (1.1)
where v(t, x) is a continuous function on the domain D := [0, T ] × [c,∞) \ {(0, c)} satisfying
the following two properties:
• For every compact subset K of D there exists LK ≥ 0 such that |v(t, x) − v(t, y)| ≤
LK |x− y| for all (t, x), (t, y) ∈ K.
• There exists a constant C ≥ 0 such that |v(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|) for all (t, x) ∈ D.
By V we denote the class of all such functions v.
In the linear Almgren–Chriss model, the permanent price impact generated at time t by
the strategy ξ in (1.1) is of the form γ
∫ t
0
ξs ds = γ
∫ t
0
v(r, Sr) dr, where γ > 0 is the permanent
impact parameter [1]. Thus, the actual exchange rate process is of the form
Svt = S˜t + γ
∫ t
0
v(r, Sr) dr +Rt, (1.2)
where Rt is the permanent price impact generated by the response strategy of the central bank.
This strategy must be nondecreasing and such that the stochastic integral equation (1.2) admits
a solution S satisfying St ≥ c for all t ∈ [0, T ] P -a.s. Moreover, the response R must be adapted
to the natural filtration of S. As for the strategic investor’s strategy, we could insist that Rt is
absolutely continuous in t, but since central banks typically face less restrictions on transaction
costs than regular investors, we will only assume that t 7→ Rt(ω) is of bounded variation for
P -a.e. ω ∈ Ω. Let us denote by R(v) the class of all processes R satisfying the preceding
conditions for a given strategy v ∈ V .
The central bank has two main goals. First, the target zone must be maintained by guaran-
teeing that Svt ≥ c for all t. Second, the inventory accumulated by keeping up the target zone
must be controlled. We assume that this inventory at time t is given proportional to the local
time
Lct(S
v) = lim
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t
0
1
[c,c+ε]
(Svr ) d〈Sv, Sv〉r = lim
ε↓0
σ2
ε
∫ t
0
1
[c,c+ε]
(Svr ) dr, P -a.s.,
of the semimartingale Sv at c.
Next we consider the optimal strategy of a speculative trader who tries to maximize the
central bank’s inventory with the goal of pushing it to its risk limits and so to force it to
abandon the target zone. The accumulation of excessive risk is indeed one of the most common
reasons why a central bank would abandon a target zone. Thus, the speculative investor aims
to maximize the expected central bank inventory at a given future time T . That is, the goal is
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to maximize E[LcT (S
v)]. According to the linear Almgren–Chriss model, the investor’s trading
strategy ξt = v(t, S
v
t ) creates transaction costs, sometimes also called “slippage”, proportional
to ∫ T
0
ξ2t dt =
∫ T
0
(v(t, Svt ))
2 dt.
These costs arise, e.g., from short-term price impact effects and from the need to increase
the proportion of market vs. limit orders in a strategy with high trading speed. We therefore
assume that the goal of the investor is to
maximize E
[
LcT (S
v)− κ
∫ T
0
v(t, Svt )
2 dt
]
over v ∈ V . (1.3)
Our main result provides a closed-form solution to the preceding problem of stochastic opti-
mal control and thus establishes a Stackelberg equilibrium in our stochastic differential game
between trader and central bank. As a result, we have singled out the worst-case scenario a
central bank may be facing when keeping up a (one-sided) target zone.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that S0 > c and let β = γ
2/(2κσ2) and
U(t, z) =
1
β
log
(
E
[
exp
(
βσL
(z−c)/σ
t (W )
)])
, z ≥ c, (1.4)
where Lxt (W ) is the local time of the Brownian motion W at level x ∈ R. Then we have
U(t, S0) = sup
v∈V
E
[
Lct(S
v)− κ
∫ t
0
v(r, Svr )
2 dt
]
.
Moreover, U(t, z) belongs to C1,2((0, T ]× [c,∞)), and there exists a unique strategy v∗ ∈ V for
which the supremum is attained. It is given by
v∗(t, z) =
γ
2κ
∂zU (T − t, z). (1.5)
Remark 1.2. From Formula 1.3.3 on p. 161 in [5] we get a closed-form expression for U ,
U(t, z) =
1
β
log
(
erf
( z − c
σ
√
2t
)
+ e−β(z−c)+β
2σ2t/2
[
1− erf
( z − c
σ
√
2t
− βσ
√
t√
2
)])
, (1.6)
where erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−y
2
dy is the Gaussian error function. See Figure 3 for a plot of U(t, z)
and v∗(t, z).
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Figure 3: The value function U(t, z) (left) and the optimal strategy v∗(t, z) (right) for σ = γ =
κ = 1 and c = 0
.
2 An approximate control problem
In this section, we consider a regularized version of the control problem (1.3). This control
problem provides the basis for the informed guess of the value function and optimal strategy
in Theorem 1.1. It is also interesting in its own right. To this end, we define
Gε(x) :=
1√
2piε
e−(x−c)
2/(2ε).
and the “regularized local time”
Lc,εt (S
v) :=
∫ t
0
Gε
(
Svr
)
dr.
Then we consider the following regularized version of the control problem (1.3):
maximize E
[
Lc,εt (S
v)− κ
∫ t
0
v(u)2 du
]
over v ∈ V . (2.1)
It will be convenient to make the dependence of controlled reflecting diffusion Sv on its initial
value z := S0 ≥ c explicit by writing Sv,z. With this notation, we define the value function of
the problem (2.1) by
V ε(t, z) := sup
v∈V
E
[
Lc,εt (S
v,z)− κ
∫ t
0
v(u)2 du
]
. (2.2)
The generator of Sv,z is formally given by
G = γv(t, z)∂z + σ
2
2
∂zz, (2.3)
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with Neumann boundary condition at c. Hence, standard heuristic arguments suggest that the
function V ε should solve the following Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation,
∂tU =
σ2
2
∂zzU +Gε + sup
v∈R
(γv∂zU − κv2), in (0, T ]× (c,∞), (2.4)
with initial condition
U(0, z) = 0 for all z ≥ c, (2.5)
and Neumann boundary condition
∂zU(t, c) = 0 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T (2.6)
The maximum over v ∈ R on the right-hand side of (2.4) is attained in
v∗ =
γ∂zU
2κ
, (2.7)
and so (2.4) becomes
∂tU =
σ2
2
∂zzU +Gε +
γ2
4κ
(∂zU)
2, in (0, T ]× (c,∞). (2.8)
Let h(t, z) be such that U(t, z) = 2κσ
2
γ2
log h(t, z). Then, h must solve
∂th =
σ2
2
∂zzh+
γ2
2κσ2
hGε, in (0, T ]× (c,∞), (2.9)
with initial condition h(0, z) = 1 and boundary condition ∂zh(t, c+) = 0.
Proposition 2.1. Let β = γ2/(2κσ2). Then the function
U ε(t, z) =
1
β
logE
[
eβ
∫ t
0 Gε(z+σWr) dr
]
,
belongs to C1,2([0,∞) × R) and its restriction to [0, T ] × [c,∞) is a classical solution to the
initial value problem (2.4)–(2.6).
Equation (2.7) suggests that the optimal strategy v∗ε for the problem (2.1) is given by
v∗ε(t, x) =
γ∂zU
ε(T − t, x)
2κ
. (2.10)
To make this statement more precise, note first that
∂zU
ε(t, z) =
E
[ ∫ t
0
G′ε(z + σWr) dr · eβ
∫ t
0 Gε(z+σWr) dr
]
E
[
eβ
∫ t
0 Gε(z+σWr) dr
] . (2.11)
This function is clearly satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition in z.
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Theorem 2.2. The function U ε is equal to the value function V ε in (2.2) and the strategy v∗ε
is the Pz-a.s. unique optimal strategy in V.
Now we show that the approximate value functions approximate our original value function
(1.4), which can also be represented as
U(t, z) =
1
β
log
(
E
[
exp
(
βLc−zt (σW )
)])
. (2.12)
As in Proposition 2.1, we let β = γ2/(2κσ2).
Proposition 2.3. We have U ε(t, z)→ U(t, z) uniformly in (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R as ε ↓ 0.
3 Proofs
3.1 Proofs of the results from Section 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let
h¯(t, z) := E
[
eβ
∫ t
0 Gε(z+σWr) dr
]
, t ≥ 0, z ∈ R.
Since Gε is bounded and smooth, we may apply Theorem 3.6 in Chapter 4 of [7] to conclude
that h¯ belongs to C1,2([0,∞)× R) and satisfies
∂th¯ =
σ2
2
∂zzh¯+
γ2
2κσ2
h¯Gε
in [0,∞) × R with initial condition h¯(0, z) = 1. Since Gε is symmetric around c, the same
is true for h¯, and it follows that ∂zh¯(t, c) = 0. Hence, the restriction of h¯ to [0, T ] × [c,∞)
satisfies (2.9) together with the initial and boundary conditions h¯(0, z) = 1 and ∂zh¯(t, c+) = 0.
Retracing the steps that led to (2.9) now completes the proof of the assertion.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Itoˆ’s formula yields that for all v ∈ V Pz-a.s.,
U ε(0, Sv,zt ) = U
ε(t, z) + σ
∫ t
0
∂zU
ε(t− r, Sv,zr ) dWr +
∫ t
0
∂zU
ε(t− r, Sv,zr ) dLcr(Sv,z) (3.1)
+
∫ t
0
(
− ∂tU ε(t− r, Svr ) + γv(r, Sv,zr )∂zU ε(t− r, Sv,zr ) +
σ2
2
∂zzU
ε(t− r, Sv,zr )
)
dr
≤ U ε(t, z) + σ
∫ t
0
∂zU
ε(t− r, Sv,zr ) dWr −
∫ t
0
(
Gε(S
v,z
r )− κv(r, Sv,zr )2
)
dr,
where we have used the HJB equation (2.4) as well as (2.6) together with the fact that dLcr(S
v,z)
is supported on {r |Sv,zr = c}. Since Gε and G′ε are bounded, it follows from (2.11) that ∂zU ε
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is bounded, and so
∫ t
0
∂zU
ε(t − r, Sv,zr ) dWr is a true martingale. Using the initial condition
U ε(0, ·) = 0 and taking expectations in (3.1) gives
U ε(t, z) ≥ E
[ ∫ t
0
(
Gε(S
v,z
r )− κv(r)2
)
dr
]
. (3.2)
Taking the supremum over v ∈ V yields U ε(t, z) ≥ V ε(t, z) for all t and z.
Next, by (2.7), we will have equality in (3.1), and hence in (3.2), if and only if
v(r, Svr ) =
γ
2κ
∂zU
ε(t− r, Svr ) for a.e. r ∈ [0, t],
which gives v = v∗ε . Recall that ∂zU
ε(t, z) is bounded and continuously differentiable in both
variables, hence vε ∈ V .
The following lemma will be needed for the proof of Proposition 2.3.
Lemma 3.1. (a) Let p ≥ 1. For every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , there exists C > 0 such
sup
z∈R
E
[∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
Gε(z + σWu) du− Lct(z + σWu)
∣∣∣p] ≤ Cεp/4, for all ε ∈ (0, 1),
(b) For every λ > 0 we have
lim sup
ε→0
sup
z∈R
E
[
eλ
∫ T
0 Gε(z+σWr) dr
]
≤ E
[
exp
(
λ sup
x∈R
LxT (σW )
) ]
<∞.
Proof. The proof uses ideas from Lemma 2.2 in [3]. For simplicity, in this proof we will write
Lxt for L
x
t (σW ).
(a) Let p, t and ε as in the hypothesis. Taking c = 0 in Exercise 1.33 in Chapter VI.1 of [13],
we obtain the existence of a constant C0 depending only on p and T such that
E
[
sup
t≤T
|Lxt − Lyt |p
] ≤ C0|x− y|p/2, for all x, y ∈ R. (3.3)
From the occupation time formula we have P -a.s.∫ t
0
Gε(z + σWu) du =
∫
R
Gε(z + x)L
x
t dx =
1√
2pi
∫
R
e−x
2/2L
c−z+√εx
t dx. (3.4)
Using (3.3) and Jensen’s inequality we therefore have
E
[
sup
t≤T
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
Gε(z + σWu) du− Lc−zt
∣∣∣p] ≤ 1√
2pi
∫
R
e−y
2/2E
[
sup
t≤T
|Lc−z+
√
εy
t − Lc−zt |p
]
dy
≤ 1√
2pi
∫
R
e−y
2/2(C0ε
p/2yp)1/2 dy
≤ Cεp/4.
(b) From (3.4) we get that for any ε ∈ (0, 1),
E
[
eλ
∫ T
0 Gε(z+σWr) dr
]
= E
[
e
λ√
2pi
∫
R e
−y2/2Lc+
√
εy−z
T dy
]
≤ E
[
exp
(
λ sup
x∈R
LxT
) ]
,
and the right-hand side is finite according to Lemma 1 in [6].
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Proof of Proposition 2.3. We write again Lc−zt for L
c−z
t (σW ). Using the Lipschitz continuity of
the function log x for x ≥ 1, we get
|U ε(t, z)− U(t, z)| ≤ 1
β
E
[
sup
s≤T
∣∣eβLc−zs − eβ ∫ s0 Gε(z+σWr) dr∣∣]
≤ 1
β
E
[
eβ(L
c−z
T ∨
∫ T
0 Gε(z+σWr) dr) sup
s≤T
∣∣∣Lc−zs − ∫ s
0
Gε(z + σWr) dr
∣∣∣].
The Cauchy–Schwarz inequality thus yields
|U ε(t, z)− U(t, z)|
≤ 1
β
(
E
[
e2β(L
c−z
T +
∫ T
0 Gε(z+σWr) dr)
])1/2(
E
[
sup
s≤T
(
Lc−zs −
∫ s
0
Gε(z + σWr) dr
)2])1/2
.
(3.5)
Lemma 3.1 (b) shows that
lim sup
ε→0
sup
z∈R
E
[
e2β(L
c−z
T +
∫ T
0 Gε(Sr+z) dr)
]
≤ lim sup
ε→0
sup
z∈R
(
E
[
e4βL
c−z
T
])1/2(
E
[
e4β
∫ T
0 Gε(Sr+z) dr)
])1/2
<∞.
Using this bound along with Lemma 3.1 (a) in (3.5) thus gives that U ε(t, z)→ U(t, z), uniformly
in (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R, as ε ↓ 0.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Proposition 3.2. The function U satisfies the following partial differential equation,
∂tU(t, z) =
σ2
2
∂zzU(t, z) +
γ2
4κ
(
∂zU (t, z)
)2
, in (0, T ]× [c,∞), (3.6)
with boundary condition
∂zU(t, c) = −1, t ∈ (0, T ]. (3.7)
Proof. Let
ψ(t, x) := erf
( x
σ
√
2t
)
+ e−βx+β
2σ2t/2
[
1− erf
( x
σ
√
2t
− βσ
√
t√
2
)]
.
For t > 0, we have
∂tψ(t, x) =
βσ√
2pit
e−x
2/(2tσ2) +
βσ
2
e(x−tβσ
2)2/(2tσ2)
[
1− erf
(x− βσ2t
σ
√
2t
)]
,
∂xψ(t, x) = −βe−βx+β2σ2t/2
[
1− erf
(x− βσ2t
σ
√
2t
)]
,
∂xxψ(t, x) =
2
σ2
∂tψ(t, x).
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From (1.6) we have U(t, z) = 1
β
logψ(t, z − c). It follows that
∂tU(t, z) =
∂tψ(t, z − c)
βψ(t, z − c) , ∂zU(t, z) =
∂xψ(t, z − c)
βψ(t, z − c) . (3.8)
In particular,
∂zU(t, c) =
∂xψ(t, 0)
βψ(t, 0)
= −1.
Next, the second z-derivative of U corresponds to
∂zzU(t, z) =
∂xxψ(t, z − c)
βψ(t, z − c) − β
(
∂xψ(t, z − c)
βψ(t, z − c)
)2
.
Plugging everything together yields the assertion.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.1.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 Recall that we write Sv,z for the reflecting diffusion starting from
z = S0 > c with given v ∈ V . Itoˆ’s formula gives
U(0, Sv,zt ) = U(t, z) + σ
∫ t
0
∂zU(t− r, Sv,zr ) dWr +
∫ t
0
∂zU(t− r, c) dLcr(Sv,z)
+
∫ t
0
(
− ∂tU(t− r, Sv,zr ) + γv(r, Sv,zr )∂zU(t− r, Sv,zr ) +
σ2
2
∂zzU(t− r, Sv,zr )
)
dr
= U(t, z) + σ
∫ t
0
∂zU(t− r, Sv,zr ) dWr − Lcr(Sv,z)
+
∫ t
0
(
γv(r, Sv,zr )∂zU(t− r, Sv,zr )−
γ2
4κ
(
∂zU(t− r, Sv,zr )
)2)
dr
≤ U(t, z) + σ
∫ t
0
∂zU(t− r, Sv,zr ) dWr − Lct(Sv,z) +
∫ t
0
κv(r, Sv,zr )
2 dr,
where we have used (3.6) and (3.7) in the second step. It follows from (3.8) that ∂zU is bounded,
and so σ
∫ t
0
∂zU(t− r, Sv,zr ) dWr is a true Pz-martingale. Using the initial condition U(0, ·) = 0
and taking expectations gives
U(t, z) ≥ E
[
Lct(S
v,z)− κ
∫ t
0
v(r, Sv,zr )
2 dr
]
. (3.9)
Taking the supremum over v ∈ V shows the inequality “≥” in Theorem 1.1.
Note that we will have an equality in (3.9) if and only if
v(r, x) =
γ
2κ
∂zU(t− r, x) for a.e. r ∈ [0, t].
Finally, the formulas derived in the proof of Proposition 3.2 easily yield that v ∈ V .
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